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CHAPTER 9 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
MONROE INKER and ROBERT F. MC GRATH 
§9.1. Divorce: Cruel and abusive treatment. Cosgrove v. Cosgrove1 
is the most significant case in the area of domestic relations decided 
in Massachusetts during the 1966 SURVEY year. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, in a review limited to the material facts of a decree nisi en-
tered below in a divorce libel for cruel and abusive treatment, estab-
lished a minimum standard for a finding of insanity as a defence in 
such actions. In affirming the decree, the Court distinguished between 
a finding of mental illness and "the kind of insanity which may be a 
defence" to an action for divorce. Citing cases from numerous other 
jurisdictions,2 the Court stated that "the defence of insanity will not 
prevail if the offending spouse was capable of understanding the 
nature and consequences of his acts."3 
Upon entering the decree upholding the husband's claim of cruel 
and abusive treatment and, presumably, denying the wife's recriminat-
ing answer which charged the same treatment by him, the probate 
judge reported to the Supreme Judicial Court the material facts. 
These included, as pertinent to the latter Court's decision, incidents in 
which the wife refused to leave the house of friends and had to be 
carried out, threatened her husband with a knife, slashed him with a 
razor blade, struck him on several occasions, and smashed a Christmas 
tree in front of their three children. These acts, as the judge below 
found, clearly established cruel and abusive treatment and were 
grounds for divorce in the Commonwealth, absent a showing by a 
preponderance of evidence that the wife was insane at the time of 
their commission.4 Regarding this defence the judge reported that 
the wife had had depressive episodes, threatened suicide, been under 
psychiatric care for eight years prior to the commission of the abusive 
acts, attempted to set herself afire two years prior to the commission 
of these acts, and, a year later, received shock treatment which" 'failed 
to improve her suicidal tendencies.' "5 During the period in which 
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§9.1. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 217 N.E.2d 754. 
2 The numerous cases are cited at id. at 917, 217 N.E.2d at 756, and include 
cases from eleven other jurisdictions as well as text citations. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Rice v. Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 125 N.E.2d 787 (1955). 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 916, 217 N.E.2d 754, 755. 
1
Inker and McGrath: Chapter 9: Domestic Relations and Persons
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1966
128 1966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §9.1 
the acts were committed she was admitted to Metropolitan Hospital 
and was given shock treatment. She was released as an out-patient, 
but did not improve except for " 'periods when she acted normal: "6 
The probate judge concluded that she was "'suffering from a long 
history of mental illness resulting in schizophrenic reaction with 
suicidal tendencies.' "7 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court based 
its affirmance on the absence of any finding below that the wife 
"was ever insane," stating that the question of insanity was one of 
fact "upon which the courts have been increasingly unwilling to lay 
down sweeping rules."8 The Court did, however, observe that the 
"underlying principle" in other jurisdictions, and by implication 
henceforth in Massachusetts, is reflected in the "nature and conse-
quences of his acts" test set out above.9 
The Court, in formulating this test, appeared to lean heavily upon 
an unstated analogy to criminal law. Concluding that "the pressures 
of caring for a husband and three children ... , rather than insanity, 
[may have] caused her to behave toward her husband as she did,"IO 
the Court appeared to be saying that it is not enough to find a mental 
disease or defect. The defendant's incapacity to understand must 
arise by reason of her insanity. 
The decision, however, is unclear and incomplete as a precedent for 
future cases for two reasons: First, the definition of insanity offered 
by the Court failed to include two traditional alternative conditions 
which create a valid defence in criminal cases in Massachusetts. An 
accused is absolved of criminal responsibility not only if he did not 
know what he was doing (i.e., was unable to appreciate the nature 
and consequences of his acts) but also if he did not know right from 
wrong or if "his mind was in such a diseased condition that his reason, 
conscience and judgment were overwhelmed to such an extent that 
he 'acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse: "11 There 
appears to be no reason why a rule applicable in criminal cases should 
not be applied in divorce proceedings as well. The rationale for the 
refusal of courts to grant a divorce if the libellee commits cruel or 
abusive acts while insane appears to be that this conduct on the part 
of a person of unsound mind is not willful and intentional, and is not 
cruelty; the remedy is not divorce but commitment to an asylum.12 
Divorce is warranted only when there has been some moral dereliction 
on the part of the offending spouse. When the cause of a spouse's acts 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Court cited its statement to this effect in Woodworth v. Woodworth, 
273 Mass. 402. 408. 173 N.E. 578. 579 (1930). 
9 See text supported by note 3 supra. 
101966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915. 918. 217 N.E.2d 754. 757. 
11 Commonwealth v. Chester. 337 Mass. 702. 712. 150 N.E.2d 914. 919 (1958). 
See also Commonwealth v. Rogers. 7 Metc. 500 (Mass. 1844). 
12 See the cases and texts cited by the Court at 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915. 917, 
217 N.E.2d 754. 756. 
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is mental illness, the sane spouse is taken to have pledged himself to 
stand by her for better or for worse, just as if she were suffering from 
cancer or some other physical disease, however incurable or burden-
some. Nor would the inclusion of the right-wrong and irresistible-
impulse tests as grounds for establishing insanity expand the defence 
to cover conditions traditionally regarded in other jurisdictions as not 
warranting such treatment. In Willis v. Willis,13 one case in which 
these tests were inclbded in a definition of insanity, the court pointed 
out that delusion, hysteria, nervousness, paranoia, and similar neurotic 
conditions would not be encompassed by the broader definition. 
Nymphomania would also probably be excluded. While the rule 
announced in Cosgrove may well be regarded as dictum, since there 
was no finding of insanity at all, it will be seized upon in the future 
as supporting the proposition that the irresistible-impulse and the 
right-wrong tests are not valid criteria for determining insanity in 
Massachusetts divorce cases. 
A second lacuna in the opinion arises from the Court's perhaps in-
advertent statement that there was no finding below "either to the 
effect that the wife was ever insane, or that she was ever in such condi-
tion that she could not appreciate the nature and consequences of her 
acts."14 This statement is followed by a citation of Hartwell v. Hart-
well,15 a case in which insanity was set up as a defence to a claim of 
desertion for a period of three years, a ground for divorce under the 
applicable law.16 The Court in Hartwell stated that there must be a 
"conscious volition to continue the desertion throughout the period, 
unaffected by lunacy."17 Any insanity during the three-year period 
would interrupt the running of the period. Of necessity, a quite dif-
ferent standard must be applied when, as in the Cosgrove case, the 
wrong complained of is not of a continuing nature, but is a series of 
isolated acts. When the ground for divorce is cruel and abusive treat-
ment, it should not be sufficient to show that the wife was insane at 
any time during the period encompassing the acts complained of. If 
the libellee fails to prove that she was insane at the time of the 
commission of each act, she has failed to establish a valid defence to 
one or more acts of cruelty. The Court's statement quoted at the be-
ginning of this paragraph is probably less than dictum, since it may 
be taken as a mere statement of the obvious failure of the libellee to 
prove insanity at the time of the commission of all the acts complained 
of. But the Court may have introduced unnecessary confusion into an 
area of law presumably settled by Mitchell v. Mitchell,lB in which it 
found no error in the failure of a lower court to appoint a guardian 
ad litem for a libellee, even though the judge had found that during 
13274 S.W.2d 621 (MO. App. 1954). 
141966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 917, 217 N.E.2d 754, 756. 
15234 Mass. 250, 125 N.E. 208 (1919). 
16 R.L., c. 152, §l. 
17234 Mass. 250, 251, 125 N.E. 208 (1919). 
18 312 Mass. 165, 43 N.E.2d 779 (1942). 
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the pendency of the libel there were periods when the libellee was 
insane.19 
In summary, the Court introduced into the divorce law the basic 
premise of the criminal defence of insanity, that mental disease or 
defect alone is insufficient to establish a defence, but failed to incor-
porate into a discussion of what does constitute a defence any refer-
ence to the right-wrong and irresistible-impulse tests applied in the 
criminal law. It further failed to direct its attentibn to the time ele-
ment of the defence, giving the impression that a finding of insanity 
at any time during the period encompassing the acts complained of 
would suffice to establish a defence. 
§9.2. Divorce: Remarriage by libellee. Chapter 640 of the Acts 
of 1965 substituted a new Section 24 of Chapter 208 of the General 
Laws.1 This new section provides that after a decree of divorce has 
become absolute, either party may marry again as if the other were 
dead. It abolished the former prohibition that the party against whom 
the divorce was granted could not remarry within two years after the 
decree became absolute if the other party was living. 
Chapter 809 of the Acts of 1965 was enacted to clarify Chapter 640 
and provides that in any divorce action in which a decree of divorce 
became absolute within two years prior to the effective date of the 
earlier act,2 the party from whom the divorce was granted could, on 
or after said effective date, marry. This avoided an anomalous situa-
tion in which more recently divorced libellees would be able to re-
marry while the group whose divorces were granted earlier in time 
would still be under the two-year disability. This act is the most 
recent erosion of a statute enacted in 1841,3 which debarred the guilty 
party in a divorce action from remarrying during the lifetime of the 
innocent party. 
§9.3. Advisory Council on Home and Family. Chapter 624 of the 
Acts of 1966 established the Advisory Council on Home and Family. 
It amended Section 17·,of Chapter 6 of the General Laws, and added 
new Sections 151, 152 and 153 to the chapter. The nine member 
council is required to study and investigate: (1) the scope and opera-
tion of the laws of the Commonwealth and other states relating to 
marriage, actions affecting marriage, support of children and other 
dependents, and the effect of court decisions thereon; (2) the causes 
of family disintegration and the need for public and private programs 
for promotion of family stability; and (3) the impact of family dis-
integration on such factors as the cost of welfare programs, the in-
cidence of juvenile delinquency, and the rate of crime in the Com-
monwealth. The Council may publish pertinent information in the 
field of family life and is required to make an annual report, to be 
deposited with the State Secretary. 
19Id. at 169, 411 N.E.2d at 782. 
§9.2. 1 As amended by Acts of 19411, c. 168, §l. 
2 November 15, 1965. 
3 Acts of 1841, c. 8l1. 
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